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Coercion, Consent, Compassion  
John D. King∗ 
Law, fundamentally, is about people. Everything a lawyer 
does, every case a judge decides, every piece of scholarship a legal 
academic writes, has the capacity to increase or to decrease 
human suffering. I want to thank the Law Review for inviting me 
to comment on Claire Hagan’s excellent Note, Sheltering 
Psychiatric Patients from the DeShaney Storm: A Proposed 
Analysis for Determining Affirmative Duties to Voluntary 
Patients.1 I also want to thank Ms. Hagan for taking on such an 
important and complex set of issues. President Clarke kicked off 
this Notes Colloquium by saying that good legal scholarship 
covers topics that matter to people. That should seem obvious, of 
course, but those of you who have spent the last few months up in 
the Law Review office sifting through articles may wish that more 
of the legal academy took that advice to heart. Ms. Hagan’s effort 
to explore the limits of protection offered to those who are 
“voluntarily” committed to psychiatric facilities is a critical topic 
that matters greatly to a lot of people.  
Attempts to distinguish “voluntary” actions and valid 
“consent” to an action in the legal sense often fail to comport with 
the average citizen’s understanding of these terms. In the world I 
inhabit, criminal law, issues of voluntariness and consent play 
crucial roles in a defendant’s journey through the justice system. 
The smooth operation of the criminal justice system is only 
achieved by the willingness of the vast majority of defendants to 
give up their constitutional rights. One context in which the 
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issues of voluntariness and consent are particularly important is 
the waiver of the right to trial.2 Popular culture celebrates the 
criminal trial, the apex of our system, in which the truth is 
supposed to spring full grown from the structured clash of two 
well-armed adversaries. As we know, however, fewer than 5% of 
criminal cases ever reach that point.3 The other 95% of cases are 
resolved through plea bargaining and depend on an individual’s 
consensual and voluntary waiver of her right to trial.4 To enter 
into a plea bargain, of course, the accused must voluntarily 
consent to a conviction.5 This raises complex issues concerning 
the meaning of voluntariness within a particular set of 
constraints. 
Another familiar criminal context is the circumstance 
surrounding interrogations and the right to remain silent. We all 
know that a statement made while in state custody is only 
admissible in court if it is voluntarily made.6 This designation of 
“voluntary” turns on whether the police gave Miranda warnings 
and whether the individual then voluntarily waived her right to 
remain silent.7 It is an unfortunate truth that the police can 
obtain this consent by any manner of intimidation, trickery, 
isolation, or any number of levels of coercion up to a point.8 And 
courts consistently uphold confessions given under coercive 
                                                                                                     
 2. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (requiring federal courts to ensure that a 
defendant entering a guilty plea understands the nature and consequences of 
the plea, and that the defendant is voluntarily choosing to plead guilty).  
 3. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 273 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[O]ver 95% of all federal criminal prosecutions are terminated by 
plea bargain.”).  
 4. Id.; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (“[G]uilty 
pleas are valid if both ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’” (citation omitted)). 
 5. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749–55 (discussing the standard for a voluntary 
plea and determining that a state’s use of coercive pressures to obtain a guilty 
plea does not negate voluntariness); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring the 
court, before accepting a guilty plea, to “address the defendant personally in 
open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from 
force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement)”).  
 6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
 7. Id. 
 8. For an interesting look at how police manuals actually encourage 
coercive interrogation techniques, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning 
Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1521–90 (2008) (evaluating Miranda’s premises 
by examining several police training manuals’ instructions for interrogation).  
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circumstances, as long as these waivers meet certain formalistic 
requirements of Miranda.9 To a large extent, the formalism of the 
“Miranda warnings” has swallowed the true meaning of what it 
means to voluntarily consent to waive a right.10  
As in the criminal law context, voluntariness and consent 
play an important role in the mental-health law issue of civil 
commitment.11 As Ms. Hagan explains in her Note, individuals 
committed to state mental hospitals have traditionally been 
labeled either “voluntary” or “involuntary” upon entrance into the 
hospital system.12 This label then dictates, for the most part, the 
state’s relationship to the patient and the duty of care the state 
owes, if any, to the patient should harm befall the patient during 
her hospitalization.13 Ms. Hagan quite correctly points out the 
two major flaws in such a framework: (1) that the labels 
“voluntary” and “involuntary” may be misleading when the 
                                                                                                     
 9. For example, the Supreme Court has found that a suspect who invoked 
his right to remain silent, then later asked a police officer, “Well, what is going 
to happen to me now?” had effectively waived his right. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
462 U.S. 1039, 1042, 1046 (1983). Subsequent statements were considered a 
voluntary confession. Id. at 1043–46.  
 10.  See, e.g., Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The 
Contradictory Role of Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
103, 124–26 (2011) (arguing that, after Miranda, courts generally do not ask 
whether a confession was voluntary, but generally admit confessions if Miranda 
warnings were properly administered, even though Miranda warnings probably 
do not alleviate coercive forces); Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant 
Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 646 (2005) (discussing how bureaucratization, 
professionalism, and an increased focus on efficiency altered the conception of 
due process protections). 
 11. See generally Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to 
Make Medical Treatment Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (2012); Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion: 
Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally 
Disordered Persons, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1169 (1997); Allison D. Redlich, 
Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 605 
(2005); Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1145 (1997). 
 12. Hagan, supra note 1, at Part III.A. 
 13. See id. at Parts III–IV (discussing the significance of 
voluntary/involuntary status for determining patients’ statutory and 
constitutional rights); see also Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary 
Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitalization: Myth or Reality?, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 
26–29 (1999) (exploring various consequences of being a voluntary versus an 
involuntary patient). 
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patient’s individual circumstances are considered; and (2) that 
such a distinction may prevent courts from finding that a state 
has an affirmative duty to a voluntary patient, even when the 
patient fits within the existing functional custody or state-created 
danger exceptions.14 Ms. Hagan’s willingness to point out the 
legal fiction that underlies the formal distinction between 
“voluntary” and “involuntary” psychiatric patients has broad 
ramifications beyond the mental health context into a broader 
understanding of voluntariness and consent. 
Limiting courts to a formalistic approach to patients’ rights 
and a rigid definition of voluntariness and consent is problematic. 
Ms. Hagan describes the term voluntary as “an artificial 
signifier,”15 and she is right to underscore the importance of 
allowing courts the discretion to delve into the background of 
each case in order to determine whether true, meaningful, and 
voluntary consent was given. She notes the importance of 
questioning whether a voluntarily committed patient was even 
competent to give informed consent and questioning whether 
consent was “tainted by coercion.”16 She poses questions with 
troubling answers in this same vein, such as “What if state law 
allows a facility to hold a voluntary patient for seventy-two hours 
after the patient decides he wants to leave?” and “What if the 
hospital is aware that a particular patient is at high risk of being 
harmed by another patient?”17 What is truly compelling, however, 
is the manner in which Ms. Hagan connects each of these 
problems within the current system not just to a case, but to the 
compelling story behind the case.  
In his wonderful Article Storytelling for Oppositionists and 
Others, Richard Delgado years ago described the power of 
storytelling in legal scholarship:  
Stories, parables, and narratives are powerful means for 
destroying mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received 
wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of 
which legal and political discourse takes place . . . Ideology—
                                                                                                     
 14. Hagan, supra note 1, at Part V.  
 15. Id. at 780. 
 16. Id. at 785. 
 17. Id. at 729. 
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the received wisdom—makes current social arrangements 
seem fair and natural. Those in power sleep well at night—
their conduct does not seem to them like oppression.18  
“The cure,” Delgado said, “is storytelling . . . . [S]tories can 
shatter complacency and challenge the status quo. . . . They can 
help us understand when it is time to reallocate power.”19 One of 
the great accomplishments of Ms. Hagan’s Note is the way that 
she delves into the stories behind judicial decisions to point out 
the problems with the current two-dimensional approach used by 
courts. She argues that “[a] patient’s relationship with the state 
is more complicated than his voluntary status,”20 and the stories 
in her Note thoroughly back up this proposition.21 It is by telling 
stories about some of the most vulnerable members of our society 
that Ms. Hagan truly makes clear the urgency and importance of 
adopting a framework that will be able to take an individual’s 
treatment by the state into consideration when deciding whether 
patients are owed affirmative duties.  
The story at the heart of the problem Ms. Hagan addresses in 
her Note is that of Joshua DeShaney.22 Mr. DeShaney today is 
thirty-three years old and he lives in an assisted-living facility 
outside of Oshkosh, Wisconsin.23 He is partially paralyzed; he 
lives with profound mental retardation, and severe and 
irreversible brain damage.24 He was born to very young parents 
in Cheyenne, Wyoming.25 His father left him and the family 
before Joshua was one year old.26 When Joshua was fourteen 
                                                                                                     
 18. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413–14 (1989). 
 19. Id. at 2414–15. 
 20. Hagan, supra note 1, at 791. 
 21. See id. at Parts II.B, IV.A–B (summarizing the case histories—the 
stories—behind the leading Supreme Court and circuit court cases addressing 
affirmative duties to institutionalized people).  
 22. See id. at Part II.B.2 (detailing the DeShaney case); DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).  
 23. Lynda G. Dodd, DeShaney v. Winnebago County and the “Blessings of 
Liberty,” in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 185, 191 (Myriam Gilles & Risa Goluboff eds., 
2007). 
 24. Id. 
 25. LYNNE CURRY, THE DESHANEY CASE 13 (2007).  
 26. Id. 
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months old, his mother decided that she was unable to take care 
of Joshua.27 When later asked her reasons, her response was 
poignant: she felt herself “too young, too alone, and too poor.”28 
And so she sent him back to live with his father.29 When she was 
asked later, after all of this happened, why she did that, she said, 
she wanted for him to have a “nice kid life” that she could not 
give him.30  
The next couple of years of Joshua’s life were unspeakably 
sad. It was marked by repeated visits to the emergency room, 
repeated calls to the police, and officers and state officials of 
various stripes coming to the house.31 The first time Joshua went 
to the emergency room, when he was just two years old, he had 
injuries on his face, scalp, spine, buttocks, thighs, penis, ankle, 
and heel.32 The Wisconsin Department of Social Services opened a 
file on him that remained open, in some way or the other, for the 
rest of his childhood.33 A social worker was assigned to visit the 
house once a month, and she did.34 During the last four months 
prior to the final injury at the hands of his father, that social 
worker never laid eyes on Joshua.35 She went to the house one 
month and was told he was asleep.36 She took no action to try to 
see him.37 She went the next month and nobody was home and 
she didn’t go back.38 She went the month after that, March 7th of 
1983, and was told again that he was asleep.39 That time she 
didn’t try to wake him up, didn’t ask to see him, but stayed in the 
kitchen with his father decorating a birthday cake for another 
                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 14. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Dodd, supra note 23, at 186–91 (providing detailed information 
about the state’s involvement with Joshua while he was living in his father’s 
house).  
 32. Id. at 186. 
 33. Id. at 186–89.  
 34. Id. at 187.  
 35. Id. at 187–88. 
 36. Id. at 188.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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child.40 The next day Joshua showed up at the hospital, in a 
coma, with irreversible brain damage.41 Joshua’s mother claims 
that the social worker later said, “I knew one day the phone 
would ring and Joshua would be dead.”42 Despite the extensive 
files that were kept on Joshua DeShaney, and despite the 
mindboggling and infuriating negligence with which the state 
handled this, the Supreme Court denied relief because of its 
conclusion that the state had no constitutional duty to protect 
Joshua.43 
The DeShaney44 case was about many issues, but an 
important part of what it was about was competing visions of 
society and what duties the state owes to the vulnerable among 
us.45 As Ms. Hagan aptly discusses in her Note, it was not an easy 
case. Thoughtful critics of DeShaney who are sympathetic to a 
broader reading of state liability recognize that there could be a 
detrimental, real-world impact of allowing these suits to go 
forward and that it can be difficult to determine where the 
slippery slope would end.46 But the majority opinion in DeShaney, 
which Ms. Hagan criticizes rightly as “unrelentingly formal,”47 
seemed almost to revel in the tragic facts of that case, and to 
celebrate the Court’s unwillingness to yield to the impulse of 
                                                                                                     
 40. CURRY, supra note 25, at 32. 
 41. Id. at 33, 35–36. 
 42. Id. at 38.  
 43. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 
(1989) (“Because . . . the State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua 
against his father’s violence, its failure to do so—though calamitous in 
hindsight—simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Compare id. at 196 (emphasizing the importance of protecting 
individuals against the state’s interference and power), with id. at 208–10 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the state’s systematic and inextricable 
role in protecting vulnerable citizens), and id. at 212–13 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing “fundamental justice” and compassion for vulnerable 
individuals).  
 46. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, 
and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 1003 (1996) (“Permitting 
individuals to bring failure-to-protect claims [like DeShaney] would require the 
courts to review resource-allocation decisions and permit judges to mandate a 
level of protection different from the level determined by the political 
branches.”). 
 47. Hagan, supra note 1, at 790. 
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natural sympathy.48 Instead, the Court focused on this illusory 
and arbitrary distinction between action and inaction,49 and the 
Court created an incentive for agencies, such as Winnebago 
County DSS, not to act.50 And not for nothing, as Ms. Hagan 
pointed out, DeShaney has very few supporters among those who 
have studied or written about it.51  
Ms. Hagan also artfully navigates the tension between two 
well-meaning groups of people who address these issues,52 one 
that I would characterize as rights-oriented, and the other that I 
would call treatment-oriented. That is a thicket in the mental 
health world, and one that Ms. Hagan does a nice job of 
navigating. She does not shy away from bold statements, and she 
proposes a realistic and nuanced analysis of how courts should 
analyze the duties that a state may owe a patient with a formal 
status of voluntary.53 She takes seriously Justice Cardozo’s 
advice, which she cites in a footnote, to resist the temptation 
“when the demon of formalism tempts the intellect with the lure 
of scientific order.”54 
The most famous part of DeShaney is Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent, which is memorable for the language he uses, for the 
emotion he conveys, and for the frank manner in which he 
compares Chief Justice Rehnquist and the majority to those 
judges who decided Dred Scott55 in the fugitive slave cases, for 
                                                                                                     
 48. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (majority opinion) (“Judges and 
lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in a case like 
this . . . .”). 
 49. See id. at 200–01 (explaining that states’ affirmative actions trigger 
corresponding duties); id. at 203 (“The most that can be said of the state 
functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious 
circumstances dictated a more active role for them.”). 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the 
majority’s strict action–inaction analysis incentivizes a state “at the critical 
moment, to shrug its shoulders and turn away” rather than take protective 
action, thereby avoiding any potential liability).  
 51. See Armacost, supra note 46, at Part I (summarizing the 
overwhelmingly negative reaction to DeShaney).  
 52. Hagan, supra note 1, at 753–54, 778–79. 
 53. Id. at Part VI. 
 54. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921). 
 55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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their exaltation of formalism over justice.56 Blackmun memorably 
wrote: “Faced with a choice, I would adopt a ‘sympathetic’ 
reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice, 
and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the 
province of judging.”57 Ms. Hagan’s Note is not only well-
researched, powerfully argued, and beautifully written, it is also, 
at its heart, a compassionate piece of scholarship that allows for 
interpretation of the law to affect lives for the better.  
Ms. Hagan’s Note is timely and helpful in proposing an 
interpretive structure that would be more just and certainly more 
clear than the current caselaw. She is to be congratulated on a 
thoughtful and well-written Note. 
  
                                                                                                     
 56. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212–13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 213.  
